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THE Report of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Municipal
Bond Protective Committees is worthy of serious consideration by all lawyers
and businessmen, as well as by those actually engaged in municipal debt
adjustment. For our present purposes, we shall regard the former as lay-
men, the latter as specialists. To the laymen it furnishes elementary infor-
mation regarding the problems involved in municipal debt adjustment as
well as indicating the possibilities of abuse by committees of the powers given
them under many deposit agreements. While such information is not of
particular value to the specialists, because it is only part of that which is
assumed to be the common equipment of their group, the Report does never-
theless give to the specialists the benefit of a rather hostile criticism by highly
intelligent and honest laymen of a machine built up by specialists for the
protection of bondholders-the creditors' committee acting under a deposit
agreement. The Commission in its Report advises the layman of the pitfalls
for the bondholder contained in the deposit agreement and of the ways in
which a committee may abuse its powers. It advises the specialist that a
mechanism which the specialist believes to work in most cases for the best
interests of the bondholders has, in the opinion of the Commission, been so
often misused as to require re-examination and perhaps reconstruction.1
Broadly speaking, the Report points out that the principal difficulties in
reaching a fair and equitable adjustment of municipal debt arise in answering
two problems: what is to be done when a minority of those having a property
interest in a matter will not agree with the majority but persist in quarreling,
arid, second, how can a great number of principals confer upon a common
agent adequate powers to represent and protect the principals and at the
same time so restrict those powers that he can do no harm if he is dishonest
or incompetent?
The Report is organized in two parts. First, the Commission reports
on the judicial remedies looking toward financial readjustment now available
to bondholders and to municipalities, and the limitations and defects of such
judicial remedies. Then, it considers the extra-judicial mechanism built up
by bankers and lawyers for the protection of bondholders-the creditors'
1. The Report does not deal with the recent instances such as those of the City of
Detroit and the State of Arkansas, where refundings have been satisfactorily accom-
plished through the medium of bondholders' committees and deposit agreements, nor
with the recent instances such as those of the cities of Jersey City and Camden, N. J.,
Yonkers, N. Y. and Greensboro, High Point and Raleigh, N. C., where refundipgs
have been worked out with the assistance of municipal bond dealers but without the
aid of the formal committee and deposit agreement.
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committee acting under a deposit agreement---calling attention to its failure
to supplement fully the limited and defective judicial remedies and empha-
sizing its susceptibility to abuse if unregulated. Our discussion of the Report
will be divided in a like manner.
PRESENT-DAY JuDICiAL REMEDIES AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS
In this Report the Commission points out that a very large amount of
municipal bonds are in default ;2 that it is generally agreed that for the most
part these defaults have been occasioned by a genuine inability to meet claims
for debt service as they mature rather than by outright "repudiation" senti-
ment ;3 that the history of municipal defaults in the past century proved the
futility in such cases of any attempt by the creditors to solve the situation
by litigation alone;4 that, barring the exceptional case of outright repudia-
tion, litigation by the bondholders is only.ancillary to ex\'tra-judicial negotia-
tions for a refunding, and indeed one of its main purposes is to exert pressure
on the municipal officers to agree to a speedy settlement and refunding;5 and
that, even if a preponderating majority in amount of the creditors and the
municipality agree upon a refunding, and even if such a refunding is fair
and reasonable, there is no method of making such a refunding binding upon
a non-assenting -minority.6 It recognizes that municipal attorneys, invest-
ment bankers and public officials are confronted with an unfamiliar situation,
for the handling of which no time-tested judicial machinery exists, and it
accordingly believes that there remains "almost an untouched, and certainly
an unsolved, problem for legislative aid and inventiveness.! 7 State legisla-
tion designed to meet the problem, particularly those statutes which authorize
a refunding when consented to by a substantial majority of the creditors
and by the municipality and approved by a state court, is said to be con-
stitutionally questionable8 in view of the treatment of the "obligation of
contracts" clause in Sturges v. CrowinshieldO and the statements made in
Ogden v. Saunders with reference to position of non-resident creditors.1 0
The Commission finally passes to the consideration of sections of the National
Bankruptcy Act dealing with insolvent municipalities (Sections 78-80) and
while concluding that these provisions have been of benefit, it suggests amend-
ments to carry out and make more effective their general purpose.n
We believe that the emphasis placed by the Report in this summary of
the existing judicial remedies available to bondholders and municipalities
is undue in two respects: first, in regard to the power of a small minority
2. §, p. 1.
3. §111, p. 16.
4. §111, p. 16.
5. §III, A, pp. 16-26, particularly p. 26.
6. §I1, C, pp. 27-30.
7. §II, p. 13.
8. §VII, A, pp. 113-116.
9. 4 Wheat. 122 (U.S. 1819).
10. 12 Wheat. 213 (U.S. 1827).
11. §VII, B, pp.116- 123 .
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to prevent the consummation of any adjustment, no matter how reasonable
and how satisfactory it may be to the municipality and to the majority of the
bondholders, and, second, in regard to the desirability of resolving the situ-
ation by federal legislation enacted in pursuance of the bankruptcy power.
Since the issuance of the Report, the Supreme Court has held Sections
77-80 of the National Bankruptcy Act, which purported to exercise the
bankruptcy power in the case of municipalities, constitutionally invalid.12
So much reliance was placed in the Report on the existence of congressional
power' 3 so to legislate that we are now left without a guide as to how the
ends which the Commission deemed desirable are to be attained. However,
the real difficulties in dealing with municipal debt adjustment are factual-
not constitutional-for, where a substantial majority agree upon a fair re-
funding, a way is usually found to bring in the dissenters. While there is
no way of telling how much the mere presence of the municipal provisions
in the National Bankruptcy Act contributed to the substantially unanimous
agreements of creditors by means of which many recent municipal refundings
have been consummated, it is surely premature to assert that the only
solution of the question of the irreconcilable minority lies in federal or state
legislation. In the past courts have generally found a judicial solution for
problems which seemed insoluble, even if the solution was merely to permit
the parties to exhaust themselves through too successful litigation. Pyrrhic
victories are not unknown to the law.
Since there is, however, undoubtedly room for improvement in the existing
situation, let us now turn to the defects pointed out by the Report. The
Commission seems to have reached the conclusion, in which we concur, that
there are two principal defects in the existing judicial procedure: the first,
that the law is defective in that it has thus far provided no omnibus proceed-
ing in which the rights of all creditors may be asserted and adjudicated, and
the taxing power of the municipality enforced for their benefit; the second
(already referred to) that the present judicial machinery is incomplete in
that it provides no method for giving binding force over all creditor* to
the fair and reasonable refunding which is the only practical solution in
most cases of bona fide default. The substance of the difference between
the conclusions of the Commission and our views lies in the great im-
portance which the Commission attaches to the absence of power to coerce
the dissenters as compared with the absence of an omnibus proceeding. In our
opinion the absence of an omnibus proceeding is in practice the more serious
weakness. If such an omnibus proceeding were afforded, all the issues in the
case would be brought to the surface. In its absence, many important and
relevant problems are often concealed because the character of the litigation
12. Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District No. 1, 56 Sup. Ct. 892
(1936) (Mandate stayed pending motion for reargument).
13. In its Report the Commission says: "In view of the fact that the problem of
amendment of Sections 78-80 of the Bankruptcy Act and the problem of effecting
adequate control over protective committees in this field are not mutually independent,
more specific legislative recommendations must await determination of that fundamental
constitutional issue." §VII, p. 124.
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may be controlled either by an individual's desire to secure a preference
over others who have equal rights, or by a committee's desire to force all
bondholders to be represented by that particular committee.1 4
The Commission agrees that the first thing to be done is to provide a
judicial proceeding in which all may be heard and all protected. Thus the
Report emphasizes the use of litigation as ancillary to negotiations for a
refunding. And; in connection with the late Federal Municipal Bankruptcy
Act, it indicates its belief in the necessity for permitting the enforcement in
one action of remedies for all creditors, in accordance with its evident opinion
that individual proceedings should be stayed, stating :15
"Inasmuch as a stay of litigation is involved it would seem that the court
should be expressly authorized to make such orders in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding from time to time as may be necessary to protect the interests of
creditors thus debarred from bringing independent actions at law or In equity.
For unless the court is empowered in its discretion to order at least as much
as the creditors might themselves obtain by litigation in the absence of a stay
there is real danger that filing under the act might be abused by debtor taxing
districts as a mere shield for delay."
The Commission thus favors an omnibus proceeding to settle the rights of
all creditors, but solely as part of a general procedure for readjusting munici-
pal debts under -a statute enacted in pursuance of the federal baiikruptcy
power.
Provision can, however, be made for an omnibus proceeding without re-
sorting to constitutionally doubtful legislation. There are indications that
the courts may work out what will be in substance an omnibus proceeding.
For many years the federal courts have exercised discretion in the issuance
of writs of mandamus to avoid the levy of taxes which they considered detri-
mental to the creditors as well as to the municipalities and which, if imposed,
might result in warfare between the taxpayers and the bondholders. The
existence of this discretionary power has been recently reassertedL10 It
furnishes the necessary formula for avoiding unduly harassing litigation in
the federal courts detrimental to the public and to other bondholders, and
until there is proof to the contrary, we see no reason to believe that most
state courts will not exercise a similar discretion. Thus, both state and
federal tribunals may well come to the point where in the exercise of their
discretion they will withhold aid to the claimant unless he consents that all
other creditors be similarly aided, and will withhold protection to the munici-
pality unless it does everything possible for the claimant and all other credi-
tors. Moreover, provision for an omnibus proceeding might be made in a
state statute; we are not yet convinced that such a statute would be per se
unconstitutional
While the Federal Municipal Bankruptcy Act did not provide an omnibus
proceeding to enforce the taxing power, it did offer a means of foreclosing
the dissenters and was therefore approved by the Commission, but we are
14. §V, p. 102.
15. §VII, p. 123.
16. City of Asbury Park v. Christmas, 78 F. (2d) 1003, (C.C. A. 3d, 1935), cert.
denied, 296 U. S. 624 (1936), (1936) 45 YAx. L. J. 702.
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not at all sure that it would have been better for the bondholders, for the
municipalities and for the community if the Supreme Court had held it valid.
Although such a holding would have answered the particular problem which
the Commission deems so important, at the same time it would have pre-
sented a new series of problems, the solution of which might be quite as
unsatisfactory both to the bondholders and to the municipalities as is the
present incompleteness of judicial procedure. Muddling through with the
judicial resources now available may involve less trouble for all parties than
some untried statutory scheme.
THE CREDITORS' COMMITTEE AND THE DEPOSIT AGREEMENT
The bulk of the Report is concerned with creditors' committees and
deposit agreements. It contains a valuable collection of facts, with each
reader being left, on the whole, to infer his own conclusions. It is difficult
to discover what the Commission approves and what it disapproves, and,
when it indicates that it does not approve, it is difficult to tell what it proposes
as a change for the better. In fact, we have concluded that its pronouncement
that "regulation of the personnel and practices of protective committees in
connection with municipal debt readjustment is absolutely essential"' 7 is to
be taken as the sum total of its opinions and recommendations. If we are
right in this, the Report raises but does not answer the political, social,
economic and factual problems which may be thus posed: what are the
boundaries of effectiveness in theory and in practice which limit the desira-
bility of having public agencies to supervise or to supplant protective com-
mittees in guarding the interests of creditors of municipalities?
The implications involved in this question are too broad and too important
to be adequately considered in a review of the Commission's Report. It
suggests many problems which future developments in the financial world
may answer. It remains to be seen what the objectives of administrative
control of business activities should be, and how detailed such control can
become without losing effectiveness, or becoming destructive. We shall,
thetefore, merely attempt to bring out into the open some of the questions
adumbrated by the facts marshalled in the Report and by its recommdndation
of governmental regulation. The Report reflects certain basic attitudes or
rnremises which characterize the whole study. One of these (discussed above)
is the belief that federal legislation is necessary for, and will be successful
in, accomplishing effective reorganization of defaulting municipalities. Another
is the conviction that administrative control, apparently to be exercised by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, is needed to protect creditors
against the dangers and abuses of deposit agreements.
The creditors' committee acting under a deposit agreement was developed
as a device to meet the problem (a) of effectively enforcing, against the
debtor, the rights belonging to many creditors whose rights were equal,
and (b) of effectively enforcing, against the minority of the creditors and
the debtor, the wishes of a preponderating majority for the reorganization
17. §VIII, p. 125.
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of the properties. This device has been used and developed principally in
connection with receiverships and particularly in connection vith equity
receiverships of private corporations in the federal courts. It has met an
economic need. Broadly speaking, it has served the purposes of the credi-
tors well and cheaply-certainly better and more cheaply than if every
creditor acted for himself and were separately represented. The creditors'
committees necessarily made use of the equity receivership power of the
federal courts to make their reorganizations effective, and the federal courts
thus brought into the situation have extended their protecting arm over the
minority. Creditors faced with the problem of municipal financial reor-
ganization naturally turned to the committee-and-deposit device well known
in the reorganization of private corporate debtors. But in a municipal in-
solvency there was no judicial proceeding like the equity receivership where
the rights of all could be enforced and protected by a court. The municipal
creditors' committee therefore lacked that element of court cooperation which
had contributed so much to the confidence with which creditors of a private
corporation were accustomed to entrust their interests to a committee acting
in an equity receivership.
In view of this lack of judicial assistance in municipal reorganizations,
we agree with the Commission that the existing situation can be improved,
but, as we have indicated, it is difficult to discover in detail exactly what the
Commission does recommend by way of reform. In its Report the Com-
missicn savs in substance: the committee's powers will usually be found
broad enough to enable it to act in almost every conceivable way without
consulting the depositors; by a more or less irrevocable transfer a trust title
as well as full control over the securities is vested in the committee; the
depositor has no choice but to enlist for the duration of the war.18 Vell,
what of it? Can anything ever be accomplished without the power to act?
Is there any practical dlifference between a trust and an agency? Does
the Commission believe that each depositor should be allowed to withdraw
at any time? If so, on what terms? If the Commission means to suggest
that a committee can pracically disregard the wishes of a majority in
amount of the depositors, we think that it is dealing in pure theory. It
certainly cites no case in which a committee has actually disregarded the
wishes of a great majority of its depositors. If it merely meant that a
majority in amount (or some other percentage) of the depositors should
be allowed to terminate the agreement, or to remove any member of the
committee, why did it not say so?19
Parts of the Commission's Report indicate that abovt all it is disturbed
by the extensive powers and immunities given to the committees, particularly
in view of what the Commission considers the surrender of all control by
the depositors "for the duration of the war". We suspect that the Com-
mission knows as well as its readers that these powers are not really so
broad or so free from judicial control as the literal language of the Report
18. §IV, A, p. 39.
19. It is striking that the Commission in its Report cites no testimony of any
depositor who feels that he has been injured by any act or omission of a committee.
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would indicate.20 Be that as it may, it would seem as though these objec-
tions of the Commission could be met quite simply by remodelling deposit
agreements so as to give to the depositors rights (substantially like those of
stockholders) to call meetings, to elect the members of the committee, etc.
While such changes in the deposit agreement might meet the approval of
the Commission, we think, however, that the Report evidences a way of
thinking that points to a reform more fundamental than a change in habits
of drafting deposit agreements: that is, that the creditors' committees' obliga-
tions be deemed to be controlled by a law of status rather than by the terms
of an individual contract. The Commission apparently believes that in all
cases, irrespective of the terms of the particular deposit agreement, the
committee should owe certain fixed fiduciary duties to depositors.
2'
In pursuance of what we deem its basic premise, the Commission points
to the powers and immunities, ostensibly conferred upon creditors' com-
mittees by many deposit agreements, as horrible examples of attempts to free
agents from their proper responsibilities to their principals, and then asserts
that at some point society begins to have an interest in the rules of conduct
and powers of agents (or trustees) which cannot be modified by private
contract. In this the Commission is clearly right and some way can and
will be found to protect this social interest. Plans can be devised to give
effective power to various agencies and at the same time curb their capacity
for harm. Whether it is desirable that this interest of society and creditors
in enforcing such a curb upon the powers of creditors' committees should be
enforced by more and more governmental control through state or national
commissions is, however, open to question.
The Commission has not told us much when it has let us know only that
it advocates some form of regulation. Only the most irreconcilable Bourbon
would insist upon complete freedom of action for creditors' committees. The
question is, what kind of regulation should there be and how much of it?
Would it be enough to require complete publicity as to the deposit agree-
ment, the expenditures and other proceedings of the committees thereunder?
Is-it sufficient to move from contract to status either by enforcing by law a
standardization of the form of the deposit agreement (just as state laws
enforce the form of insurance policies) or by adopting laws fastening upon
creditors' committees and perhaps upon others certain fixed liabilities, ir-
respective of any contract made between the parties (just as recent New
York laws do in defining certain powers of fiduciaries and the restrictions
thereon, irrespective of the provisions of the instruments under which the
fiduciaries act)? Or must every move of the committees be subjected to
personal and unpredictable commission-control? Does the Commission pro-
pose that the law be amended so as to permit public officials to protect the
investor and society against dishonest committees, or does it propose that
the law be amended so as better to enable the investor to do it for himself?
20. §V, p. 64.




Whatever may be our views either in regard to the distribution of national
and state powers with respect to these problems, or in regard to the relative
merits of commission-action as opposed to investor-action, many of us will
agree that the powers of agents and trustees and the rules controlling them
are a matter of public interest and that the Commission's Report renders a
useful service in bringing that point to the surface. Some of us will regret
that the Commission did not consider a little more sympathetically the
difficulties and problems of those who are compelled actually to attempt
municipal debt adjustment and that it did not consider more fully the real
and practical limitations upon beneficial governmental administration and
control where municipal debt adjustment is being attempted.
E. J. Dimoc#
ARNOLD FRY.t
UNCOMMON LAW. By A. P. Herbert. New York: Doubleday, Doran & Co.,
1936. Pp. xvii, 298. $2.00.
WHEN Mr. Bumble declared that "the law is a ass," he achieved immor-
tality not through the profundity of the remark but because, without any
grammatical inhibitions, he had given satisfactory expression to a sentiment
entertained by millions of his fellows who do not share the beadle's freedom
from linguistic restraint. Mr. A. P. Herbert, known to all devotees of Punch
as "A.P.H.," is in entire agreement with Mr. Bumble, but in order to match
the beadle's famous phrase he has found it necersary to publish several quite
sizable books of which The Uncommon Law is the latest. This volume, like
its predecessors, Misleading Cases and More Misleading Cases, is a col-
lection of pretended reports of farcical law cases that have appeared from
time to time in Punch. Now A. P. H., in addition to being a humorist, is quite
a person. As a member of Parliament, representing Oxford University, he
has contributed much to the enlightenment and joy of the House of Com-
mons-as when he answered an impassioned attack of a Glasgow Laborite
upon Sir Oswald Mosley's Blackshirts by the brief imprecation, "A plague
upon both your blouses !" So in a letter to his electors he said, "I am for
peace with honour; but not war without armaments." His literary and social
standing is sufficiently attested by the introductions, not one but two, written
by Lord Atkin, Lord of Appeal in Ordinary, and by Lord Chief Justice
Hewart.
Mr. Herbert was trained for the law, and actually called to the bar in the
Inner Temple, but never practiced, being led off into the gayer and more
attractive field of literature. But his legal training, though it could not make
a lawyer of him, strongly affected his literary bent. His novels, of which he
has written a goodly number, as well as his many humorous skits, are deeply
tinged with legal learning and near learning.
The case parodies in this volume are for the most part satires upon lawyers
and judges and the structure of the law itself, somewhat resembling the
tMember of the New York Bar.
tMember of the New York Bar.
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Tutt and Mr. Tuti stories of Arthur Train, but done with a lighter touch,
in the style current in Punch for a hundred years. But the implication of
the title that it is the Common Law that excites A.P.H.'s ire and wrings
his withers, if any, is not borne oit. The Court of Probate and Divorce
affords a favorite target for his shafts, while the stupidity and ignorance of
Parliament and the futility of its legislation draw an unceasing fire of gay
and humorously sarcastic comment. Thus in one -of his pseudo-appeals he
has the Lord Chancellor say, "If we are prepared to amend the Common
Law, most of which is still sensible, what is to be our attitude to Modern
Statute Law, most of which is not? Nearly all the laws recently enacted
by Parliament are vexatious and foolish." Evidently A.P.H. has no very
high opinion of his Parliamentary colleagues, for on the same appeal the
Lord Chancellor is made to describe them as "The queer and cowardly rabble
who are elected to Parliament." Probably the author loves jesting more than
political preferment.
However, the Common Law does not escape his witty but always genial
and gay criticisms. He makes merry over the silly persistence of the rule
that the whale is a "royal fish," the tail, however, belonging to the Queen,
to provide Her Majesty with "whale-bone for her royal purposes." He
heaps ridicule upon the Common Law distinction between libel and slander,
and makes the rule that the Crown is not liable for the torts of Crown
servants appear as absurd as it really is. To make the Common Law doctrine
of liability for enticement seem entirely ridiculous, and also to show his
opinion of women out of place and out of hand, he introduces a Lady Chan-
cellor, who, after first ordering the removal of the wool sack as an unsightly,
unsanitary and uncomfortable bit of furniture, declares, "This appeal
calls for a little clear feminine thinking and plain feminine speech . . . . I
shall never be heard to say, as inferior "judges are so often compelled to say,
'It is absurd, but it is the law !' What is absurd shall not in This House
be the law. The whole doctrine of enticement as applied to wives and hus-
bands, is antiquated nonsense."
But it is the multitude of statutory regulations hedging in the once free
Englishman on every side, that excites our author to witty recklessness.
Being himself a popular writer with a corresponding income, he feils him-
self pinched by the revenue laws and the statutes governing copyrights. He
is also much annoyed by motor cars and the hideous disharmony of their
honking horns. In jeering at these monstrous incidents of modern life he
creates as his protagonist Mr. Albert Haddock, a prosperous and ingenious
author, with a distinct zest for litigation. Mr. Haddock is made to sue more
fantastic claims and set up more unprecedented defenses to ridiculous actions
than any other known litigant, in books or out of them. This litigious person
gives occasion to A.P.H.'s judges to declare that honking of motor horns
is an enjoinable nuisance; that the motor car is the same as a wild beast,
and so subject to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, L. R. 3 H. L. 330; that
a motor car traversing a flooded street is governed not by the rules of the
road, but by those of the sea; that the term "high-brow" is libelous; that
G. Bernard Shaw is a "skittish old gentleman" obviously unable "to furnish
useful information on any subject whatever ;" that the Magna Carta, which
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most Englishmen regard as the foundation of such few liberties as are still
left to them, is no longer in force; that all the members of the Cabinet are
liable to prison sentence inasmuch as all had promised to procure employ-
ment for the unemployed voters, contrary to the Corrupt Practices Act, in
such case made and provided; and to perform many other judicial feats
equally fantastic and amusing. It is even declared that the Income Tax, for
which our author has no good word, is a tax on virtue, since a happily
married couple having separate incomes, may, by securing a divorce and
thereafter living in sin, materially reduce their tax liability.
The author in his preface to Misleading Cases told us that "these frolics
in jurisprudence" are "shyly intended not only to amuse but to amend."
They are delightfully witty and hilariously amusing, but as the reader lays
down the volume there comes to him the memory of John Trumbull's couplet:
"No man e'er felt the halter draw
With good opinion of the law".
rather than any vision of law reform.
WmLmI.s IL VANc4
New Haven, Conn.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw OF THE UNrrED STATES. By Hugh Evander Willis.'
Bloomington: The Principia Press, 1936. Pp. viii, 1198. $10.00.
THE writing of a comprehensive text on constitutional law is a stupendous
undertaking. It is true that there are not here, as in private law subjects,
conflicting decisions by different courts of equal authority. But this sim-
plifying factor falls far short of compensating for the complexities peculiar
to constitutional law. History, politics, economics, and psychology are doubt-
less aids to the understanding of private law. They are the very stuff of
which constitutional law is made, more important for its understanding than
even decisions and doctrines. Yet decisions and doctrines are of tremendous
importance in constitutional law. In terms of them, arguments are made
and opinions written. Moreover, they close many routes toward desired
legislative ends. Recent cases make it probable that they close all routes to
some ends. In marshalling decisions and doctrines, the task of the consti-
tutional law writer is more complex and more difficult than that of the private
law writer. Lawyerlike thinking of the deepest and closest sort is required
for the culling out of those decisions and doctrines which are moribund and
for the synthesizing of those which are likely to live. And in this thinking,
constant account must be taken of political, social, economic, and psycho-
logical factors. There must be constant awareness of changing climates of
opinion with respect to the proper spheres not only of each governmental
organ but of government itself.
Professor Willis is aware of the hugeness of his undertaking. He is of
the cognoscenti. Time and again he tells us that the Supreme Court justices,
tProfessor of Law, Yale University.
1. Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law.
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not the framers, have given us our Constitution. His is the first compre-
hensive text which stresses this fact. As he sees it, the Supreme Court's
function is the weighing of social interests. The justices delimit social con-
trol and personal liberty. They determine which of conflicting interests shall
prevail. Professor Willis recounts and evaluates what they have done. He
goes further. He outlines and evaluates the New Deal. He offers solutions
for the problems of insufficient purchasing power, a too heavy debt structure,
and unemployment.
The book is decorated, rather than permeated by the author's historico-
sociological approach. Chapters originally written as disconnected articles
have not been rewritten so as to become parts of an organized whole. In the
midst of technical discussions, one encounters unexplained, unexpanded half
or quarter truths such as: "The social interest protected by bankruptcy
laws is the social interest in the individual life."'2 Professor Willis has read
widely in current social and economic writings. He builds his text in large
part upon the countless law review articles and notes which he cites. But
he seems to the reviewer to have failed to digest them thoroughly or to
incorporate them in an organized way into his text. Psychological factors,
especially emotional attachments to traditional institutions and symbols, are
very inadequately treated. Perhaps it is impossible for any one man to
reappraise and restate from the historico-sociological point of view the whole
of constitutional history and constitutional law. Perhaps Professor Willis
may deserve praise for his temerity rather than censure for what seem to
the reviewer the shortcomings of his attempt.3
In dealing with decisions and doctrines, Professor Willis also builds on
law review notes and articles. Seldom does he offer fresh thought of his
own on difficult problems. The niceties of doctrine are rarely explored.
4
2. P. 408.
3. Occasional minor inaccuracies occur:
E.g., pp. 647-648: "The supremacy of the common law over acts of Parliament was
established for a short time by Dr. Bonham's Case [ (1610) 8 Co. Rep. 113b, 118a], but
this overthrow of parliamentary supremacy was disavowed in England by the case of
Lee v. Bude, etc., Ry. [(1871) L. R. 6 P. C. 576, 582]. And ever since this decision the
doctrine of parliamentary supremacy has obtained in England."
Again, p. 380: "Congress has not yet levied direct taxes . . . " See Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 8 Wall. 533, 542 (U.S. 1869) for the direct taxes levied and apportioned among
the states by Congress in 1798, 1813, 1815, 1816, and 1861.
4. The reviewer is occasionally unable to follow Professor Willis's reasoning. E.g., at
pp. 497-498 it is concluded that "the Supreme Court must give to freedom of speech and
of the press in the First Amendment the same meaning that it gives it under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment". This conclusion is thought to result from
the following reasoning: " . . . since it has adopted the liberal method of interpretation
in the case of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and has applied the
same method of interpretation to the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, and
since it has made the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include freedom




Occasionally obvious grounds of decision are overlooked5 and at times an
incomplete comprehension of the intricacies of doctrine is displayed.'
The book, then, is no masterpiece. But it should be useful. A seventy-six
page index and a sixty-two page case list make available the myriad cases
cited and discussed. The reader is given an invaluable lead to more detailed
discussion of his problems by the frequent citations of law review notes and
articles (a double column list of which covers thirty pages. Prodigious must
have been the labor involved in collecting and collating these cases and notes
and articles. In availing themselves of the fruits of this labor, doubtless many
lawyers will learn for the first time, from Professor Willis' pages, something
of the true nature of the judicial process in constitutional cases.
DouGLAs B. MAGGst
Durham, North Carolina.
CARTEL PROBLEMS. By Karl Pribram. Washington: The Brookings Insti-
tution, 1935. Pp. x, 287. $2.50.
Tnixs little volume more than fulfills the modest claims made for it, namely:
"It differs from most earlier studies in certain important respects., It adds
little to the descriptive analysis of cartels, or to the elaboration of the special
circumstances which have led to local variations in the development of the
cartel movement. Rather it cuts through national differentiating circumstances
in the attempt to establish certain widely applicable generalizations concern-
ing the character of the movement as a whole. This line of approach has
involved a larger degree of resort to abstract reasoning than is common to
general surveys of cartel problems."'
It is true that the author has not undertaken to make a new first hand
investigation and to collect new data from the field; but he has done a better
and more useful work in surveying thoroughly and thoughtfully the secondary
sources, the vast, rather inchoate literature of description and discussion of
the subject, in reducing it to comprehensible form, and in illuminating its
significance by his competent analysis and comment. Nor does he treat the
subject merely as a closet philosopher, for after his services in the universities
of Vienna and of Frankfort-on-the-Main, and for seven years as chief of the
Statistical Section of the International Labor office in Geneva, "lie brings
to bear upon the cartel movement a long observation of European economic
affairs," as Dr. E. G. Nourse remarks in the "Director's Preface."
The book gives in broad perspective a readable, penetrating and much
needed analysis of the data at hand, which should do much to dissipate the
5. E.g., it is stated on p. 808, in the course of a discussion of exemptions from taxation,
that "The United States Supreme Court has also for some singular reason held that the
salaries of United States judges are exempt from taxation." No reference is made to
the provision of U. S. Const., Art. III, § 1, that the salaries of judges "shall not be
diminished during their continuance in office," upon which the Court based its holdings.
6. E.g., in the treatment of state taxation of corporations engaged in interstate com-
merce (p. 808) and in the chapter on corporations (c. XXX).
tProfessor of Law, Duke University.
1. P. 1.
1936]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
hazy ideas so widely entertained on the subject. It would be vain to attempt
in a brief review to epitomize adequately a monograph which is itself a com-
pressed statement of wide and prolonged studies of a large subject. The
author betrays no evidence of having begun with a thesis to support, but
proceeding in a judicial spirit he does arrive at some pretty definite and
damning conclusions, as the reader will find. Cartels are in their nature
essentially monopolies; they have all of the wasteful features of monopoly;
they foster scarcity rather than plenty; they practice manifold forms of dis-
crimination in domestic and in export trade (in "dumping") ; their chief aim
is to enable each industry in periods of depression to reduce or escape the
"risk" which is the normal burden of each competitive enterprise, and they
thereby shift the burden unfairly to other classes of the community; they
are not elements of rational planning in any true sense; they do not stabilize
industry as a whole, but rather by freezing some prices they aggravate the
evils of a depression period for all non-cartellized industry; and a scheme
of universal cartels could only make things still worse, etc., etc. Those
economists who have been inclined to take the superficial view held in certain
business circles that something like the cartel is the specific for the ills of
capitalism may well ponder this, perhaps the most important conclusion
of the author's study: "It is impossible to regard cartelization of itself as a
development capable of improving any of the serious defects of the economic
system. It represents -merely the defensive gestures of private groups at-
tempting to protect themselves from the effects of economic instability."
2
"Self-regulation of industry", the cartel ideal, which the NRA,ambiguously
tried to realize, is therefore quite out of the author's picture of desirable
policies. The remaining alternatives are, "relatively full maintenance of free
competition" and "planned economy controlled by a central governmental
authority." Recognizing, as he evidently does, the very grave problems which
a totalitarian state of monopoly must involve, the author rather vaguely
implies a preference for the maintenance of "the competitive system", if it
is not fated to be damned by insuperable difficulties. But he sees great
danger in "the general trend of economic conditions", the chief feature of
which is the recurrence of prolonged business depressions-a thought that
looms large throughout the book. The author avoids prophesying which of
the two policies, competition or controlled monoply, will survive, and takes
the more cautious course of dispassionately forecasting in America a period
of "economic travail" with "mixed developments, showing traces of each
of the three tendencies just noted". As the reviewer understands it, this
is not what the author would prefer, were he in a position to choose, but
it is what he thinks is likely to happen in the interplay of irrational com-
promises by which history is made. In any event, although the critical reader
will have occasion at a number of points to raise here a query or there a
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